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NOTES 
Prohibiting Nonaccess Testimony by Spouses: Does Lord Mans-
field's Rule Protect ilegitimates? 
Lord Mansfield's Rule1 is a common-law rule of evidence that 
disqualifies a husband and wife from testifying as to nonaccess-lack 
of sexual relations-between them where the legitimacy of a child 
born or conceived during their marriage is at issue. 2 There are 
three archetypal situations in which the rule commonly operates in 
civil actions. 3 First, in a divorce suit or a proceeding to modify 
a divorce decree regarding child-support payments, the husband may 
wish to offer testimony of his sexual nonaccess to his wife in an at-
tempt to disclaim paternity and avoid child-support payments.4 
Second, a mother, presently or formerly married,5 may wish to offer 
her testimony6 or that of her present or former husband7 regarding 
their nonaccess to demonstrate that a third party is the natural father 
and is thus obligated to support the child. 8 Finally, testimony of 
nonaccess by the spouses might be offered to support9 or prevent10 
1. The rule is styled after the opinion of Lord Mansfield in Goodright ex dim. 
Stevens v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (K.B. 1777). See text at notes 26-37 infra. 
2. See, e.g., Kennedy v. State, 117 Ark. 113, 178 S.W. 842 (1915); Ray v. Ray, 
219 N.C. 217, 13 S.E.2d 224 (1941). See generally McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF 
mE I.Aw OF EVIDENCE § 67 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCOR-
MICK]; 7 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYsrEM OF EVIDENCE 
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW ,§ 2063 (3d ed. 1940); 10 AM. JUR. 2D Bastards § 
33 (1963); 97 C.J.S. Witnesses§ 90 (1957); Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 212 (1973). 
3. The rule has also been applied in criminal cases. See Egbert v. Greenwalt, 
44 Mich. 245, 6 N.W. 654 (1880) (criminal conversation); Hicks v. State, 97 Tex. 
Crim. 629, 263 S.W. 291 (1924) (criminal desertion of child). But see Dustin v. 
Coiner, 367 F. Supp. 396 (N.D.W. Va. 1973), in which the court rejected a habeas 
corpus petitioner's contention that the rule should have been applied in a state prose-
cution for incest. The state court had refused to exclude the nonaccess testimony 
of the prosecutrix' mother that rebutted the presumption that the prosecutrix was 
the child of the mother's first husband and not the petitioner. 367 F. Supp. at 396. 
In civil cases, West Virginia had followed Lord Mansfield's Rule. See note 43 infra. 
4. See, e.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 137 Iowa 37, 114 N.W. 527 (1908); Ford v. 
Ford, 191 Neb. 548, 216 N.W.2d 176 (1974). 
5. The right of a married woman to bring a paternity suit has been questioned 
in some jurisdictions. See note 91 infra. 
6. See, e.g., Franks v. State, 26 Ala. App. 430, 161 So. 549 (1935); State ex 
rel. Dolloff v. Sargent, 100 N.H. 29, 118 A.2d 596 (1955). 
7. See, e.g., People ex rel. Cullison v. Dile, 347 Ill. 23, 179 N.E. 93 (1931); 
State ex rel. Worley v. Lavender, 147 W. Va. 803, 131 S.E.2d 752 (1963). 
8. See, e.g., State v. Bowman, 230 N.C. 203, 52 S.E.2d 345 (1949). 
9. See, e.g., In re Wright's Estate, 237 Mich. 375, 211 N.W. 746 (1927); Barr's 
Next of Kin v. Cherokee, Inc., 220 S.C. 447, 68 S.E.2d 440 (1951). 
10. See, e.g., King v. Peninsular Portland Cement Co., 216 Mich. 335, 185 N.W. 
858 (1921). 
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recovery by the child in an action involving heirship11 or statutory 
benefits.12 In each instance the invocation of Lord Mansfield's Rule 
excludes such testimony of nonaccess. 
Although the rule is of consequence in relatively few cases in 
which the legitimacy of a child is at issue, 13 invocation of the rule 
often will prevent the plaintiff from meeting the burden of proof for 
the cause of action. 14 In every jurisdiction where it is accepted, the 
rule operates in conjunction with a legal presumption that a child 
born or conceived during the marriage is legitimate.16 Unlike pre-
sumptions that merely shift the burden of production of evidence, 
the presumption of legitimacy sp.ifts the burden of persuasion to the 
party asserting illegitimacy.16 Furthermore, this burden is often 
measured by the requirement for "clear, convincing, and satisfactory 
proof," or even for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than 
by the usual civil standard of the preponderance of the evidence.17 
Thus, the evidentiary scenario of a typical case involving legitimacy 
would include both the application of the rule to prevent the 
11. See, e.g., In re Estate of Thomas, 228 Ark. 658, 310 S.W.2d 248 (1958); 
Craven v. Selway, 216 Iowa 505, 246 N.W. 821 (1933). 
12. See, e.g., In re Risdal & Anderson, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 353 (D. Mass. 1968) 
(using Lord Mansfield's Rule in application for statutory survivors' benefits); Gib• 
bons v. Maryland Cas. Co., 114 Ga. App. 788, 152 S.E.2d 815 (1966) (rejecting 
Lord Mansfield's Rule in application for workers' compensation benefits). 
13. 112 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 615 (1964). To the extent that they positively 
exclude the spouse as a possible parent of the child, modern scientific procedures 
such as blood-testing make use of the rule unnecessary in many cases. See 1 S. 
SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNI1Y PROCEEDINGS § 3.14 (4th rev. ed. 1975). The results 
of blood tests potentially can determine parental exclusion in 75-99% of all cases. 
See Krause, Scientific Evidence and the Ascertainment of Paternity, 5 FAM. L.Q. 252, 
258-59 & n.30 (1971); Lee, Current Status of Patemity Testing, 9 FAM. L.Q. 615 
(1975). Also, polygraph tests have been suggested as an alternative means of proof. 
See 1 S. ScHATKIN, supra, §§ 18.01-18.17; Note, Evidence-The Admissibility of Poly-
graph Test Results in Paternity Cases, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 45 (1973). 
14. Invocation of the rule is likely to preclude recovery wherever spousal non• 
access testimony is crucial to a party's case. Such testimony is most necessary where 
the party wishing to establish illegitimacy has no independent evidence or third-party 
testimony of nonaccess to offer and therefore must rely on personal nonaccess testi• 
mony clearly incompetent under the rule. See Serafin v. Serafin, 67 Mich. App. 
517, 524-25, 241 N.W.2d 272, 275-76 (1976), affd. on other grounds, No. 58211 
(Mich., filed Oct. 24, 1977); note 179 infra. Even if additional evidence is available, 
the exclusion of spousal nonaccess testimony still may be fatal to the party's cause 
of action. For example, without such personal testimony the litigant might be unable 
to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. See, e.g., In re Estate of Thomas, 228 Ark. 
658, 310 S.W.2d 248 (1958); Lewis v. Powell, 178 So. 2d 769 (La. Ct. App. 1965). 
For discussion of the nature of the presumption of legitimacy and the burden of 
proof, see text at notes 154-60 infra. 
15. See bi re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930); McCORMICK, supra 
note 2, § 343, at 810-11; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2527; Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 
158 (1972). 
16. McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 343,.at 810. 
17. Id. For discussion of the requirements of the burden of proof in various 
jurisdictions, see notes 154-57 infra and accompanying text. 
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spouses from establishing illegitimacy by their own testimony of 
nonaccess and the requirement that they present a greater quantum 
of evidence to sustain the burden of proof than in a normal civil case. 
Obviously, because of the combination of the rule with the pre-
sumption of legitimacy, litigants in these cases often cannot meet 
the burden of persuasion if their evidence consists principally of 
spousal nonaccess testimony. 
Not surprisingly, there has been widespread disagreement con-
cerning the validity of the policies advanced in support of Lord 
Mansfield's Rule and the efficacy of the rule to promote those pol-
icies.18 This Note assesses the validity of this rule of evidence in 
order to determine whether it is the most appropriate method of safe-
guarding the interests affected by the litigation of legitimacy. First, 
the historical development and justifications for Lord Mansfield's Rule 
are identified, and, in section II, the extent of the current acceptance 
of the rule in the United States is delineated. Section III analyzes 
traditional arguments advanced in support of the rule, including the 
rule's impact on society's marital and parent-child role models, the 
financial obligations of the states, and the legal status and social wel-
fare of the child whose legitimacy is at issue. Various criticisms of 
the rule are assessed in section IV, and in the final section a proposal 
for the modification of the evidentiary structure of legitimacy litiga-
tion is submitted. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LORD MANSFIELD'S RULE 
The fledgling common law generally utilized a conclusive pre-
sumption that a child born during a marriage was legitimate-often 
with logically indefensible results. 19 A more lenient accommodation 
permitted the presumption to be rebutted if the husband had not 
been "within the four seas" or, more precisely, within the king's 
jurisdiction.20 By the early eighteenth century, however, the pre-
sumption was clearly rebuttable, 21 and testimony of nonaccess by the 
18. Compare Ventresco v. Bushey, 159 Me. 241, 249-50, 191 A.2d 104, 108 
(1963), with State ex rel. Worley v. Lavender, 147 W. Va. 803, 809-13, 131 S.E.2d 
752, 756-58 (1963). 
19. In Alein de Wartone v. Simon, Y.B. 32 & 33 Edw. 1, 60 (C.P. 1304), the 
court discussed an earlier case in which a husband had gone overseas for three years 
and returned to find that his wife had borne a daughter only a month before. The 
child was permitted to recover as an heir upon the husband's death "because the 
private affairs of a man and his wife cannot be known, -for he may have come 
into the country by night before and begotten this woman [the child] .... " J. 
THAYER, SELECTED CASES ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 84 (1892). 
20. 2 E. CoKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE '.INSTITUTES OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND 
§ 399 (19th ed. C. Butler 1832). 
21. See, e.g., Pendrell v. Pendrell, 93 Eng. Rep. 945 (K.B. 1732); Parish of St. 
Andrews v. Parish of St. Brides, 93 Eng. Rep. 35 (K.B. 1717); Note, The Admissi-
bility of a Parent's Testimony as to Non-Access To Prove Illegitimacy, 73 U. PA. 
L. REv. 71, 71-72 (1924). 
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spouses was admitted as substantive evidence. 22 An exception 
perhaps existed in filiation cases, 23 in which the uncorroborated testi-
mony of a mother concerning nonaccess was deemed insufficient to 
support a finding of illegitimacy. 24 This exception rested on the 
common-law disqualification of parties for interest. 2u 
Despite the apparently settled nature of the admissibility of 
spousal testimony concerning nonaccess, Lord Mansfield promul-
gated a new rule of evidence in Goodright ex dim. Stevens v. Moss. 20 
In that case the plaintiff brought an action in ejectment to secure 
possession of the premises for his lessor, who was the alleged heir 
of one who had died seised of the property. The trial judge ex-
cluded declarations of the lessor's mother that the birth had occurred 
before her marriage. On appeal, Lord Mansfield was of the opinion 
that evidence concerning the time of birth ought to have been re-
ceived, but in dicta27 he stated: "[T]he law of England is clear, that 
the declarations of a father or mother, cannot be admitted to bas-
tardize the issue born after marriage."28 His justification for such 
an exclusion of nonaccess testimony20 was based not on a disqualifi-
cation for interest as in filiation cases, 30 but on grounds of "decency, 
22. Only much later were the ways to rebut the presumption of legitimacy clearly 
identified. In Hargrave v. Hargrave, 50 Eng. Rep. 457, 458 (Ch. 1846), early com-
mon-law cases were seen as identifying three means of rebutting the presumption: 
(1) proof that the husband was impotent, (2) proof that the husband was entirely 
absent or absent during the probable period of conception, or (3) "other proof" that 
sexual intercourse did not occur or could not have occurred during the probable pe-
riod of conception. 
23. A filiation proceeding, which is analogous to a modern paternity suit, was 
an action to obtain a judicial declaration that a particular individual was the parent 
of a child. It did not have the effect of legitimating the child. BLACK'S LA w DIC· 
TIONARY 756 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). 
24. 95 Eng. Rep. at 49. It should be noted that this case is ambiguous in its 
support for the rule. Lord Hardwicke's opinion for the court emphasized the insuf-
ficiency of the mother's uncorroborated testimony to support the verdict; though 
insufficient, it does appear that the nonaccess testimony was technically admissible. 
See 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2063, at 360. Of course, the distinction may be 
meaningless insofar as it matters little whether nonaccess testimony is excluded 
altogether or admitted with the proviso that it is insufficient to support a verdict. 
The decision is significant, however, to the extent that courts have misread the case 
and invoked the rule of insufficiency even where corroborative testimony was avail-
able. 
25. The King and Reading, 95 Eng. Rep. 49, 52 (K.B. 1734). For a discussion 
of the history and abrogation of evidentiary rules concerning disqualification for in-
terest, see 2 WIGMORE, supra note 2, at §§ 575-76. 
26. 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (K.B. 1777). 
27. The real issue was the time of birth, not the fact of access. Mansfield al• 
lowed the testimony concerning the date of birth and seemingly discussed the admis-
sibility of nonaccess testimony for the purpose of contrast. 98 Eng. Rep. at 1257, 
28. 98 Eng. Rep. at 1257 (emphasis added). 
29. "[T]hey shall not be permitted to say after marriage, that they have had 
no connection, and therefore that the offspring is spurious ...• " 98 Eng. Rep. 
at 1258. 
30. See text at note 23 supra. 
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morality, and policy."31 
Although the common law in England was in fact the opposite 
of the rule set forth by Lord Mansfield in Moss,32 his rule had several 
notable effects. The rule came to be recognized both in England 
and in the United States not only in filiation and ejectment cases but 
in all actions in which the legitimacy of a child was at issue. 33 The 
testimony of a husband or wife was precluded regardless of the exist-
ence of corroborating testimony. 
Perhaps even more significant was the acceptance of Lord Mans-
field's rationale in support of the rule excluding nonaccess testimony. 
Early American decisions had preferred the rationale of disqualifica-
tion for interest to support the rule. 3-1 By the end of the nineteenth 
century, interest had been largely abrogated in many states as a basis 
in civil actions for the disqualification of testimony or witnesses.35 
However, courts preserved the rule in legitimacy cases by utilizing 
Mansfield's alternative rationale of "decency, morality, and policy."36 
Though correctly criticized as obiter dictum,37 Mansfield's justifica-
tion for the rule in Moss prevailed even to the point that he became 
the eponym for the rule. 
Because of the nature of Lord Mansfield's explanation for the 
rule, its validity must be constantly reexamined. That is, decency, 
morality, and policy are defined by contemporary standards.as Per-
haps the most easily examined indicator of the degree of harmony 
between the rule and the current societal notions of policy that support 
it is the acceptance the rule enjoys in the United States today. 
31. 98 Eng. Rep. at 1258. 
32. See text at notes 21-22 supra. But see note 24 supra. 
33. 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2063, at 363. 
34. Evans v. State ex rel. Freeman, 165 Ind. 369, 373, 75 N.E. 651, 651 (1905); 
see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Strickler, 1 Browne (app.) 47, 49-50 (Pa. Dist. Ct. 
1801). In Strickler the court stated: 
To admit a married woman . . . to swear she has lived in adultery . . . and at 
the same time to say, that she will not gi".e evidence that her husband had no 
access to her, because the evidence would be indecent, seems rather mysterious 
and incomprehensible. . . . The rule of law seems however settled. We only 
mean to say, that the reason assigned by Lord Hardwicke, appears the most satis-
factory. 
For a discussion of "the reason assigned by Lord Hardwicke," see notes 24-25 supra 
and accompanying text. 
35. See 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 575, at 674. 
36. Not only was Mansfield's alternative rationale widely utilized, but the rule-
little more than a century old-was cited as an "ancient" common-law doctrine. 
See Egbert v. Greenwalt, 44. Mich. 245, 248, 6 N.W. 654, 655 (1880). For early 
cases using the Mansfield rationale for the rule, see People ex rel. Crandall v. The 
Overseers of the Poor of Ontario, 15 Barb. 286 (N.Y. 1853); Cross v. Cross, 3 
Paige Ch. 139 (N.Y. 1832); Tioga County v. South Creek Township, 75 Pa. 433 
(1874). 
37. "The rule was stated only for the purpose of saying that it did not apply." 
Russell v. Russell, [1924] A.C. 687, 731 (H.L.). Accord, Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 
383, 388, 172 So. 317, 318 (1937). 
38. Russell v. Russell, [1924] A.C. at 743 (H.L.). 
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II. THE PRESENT STATUS OF LORD MANSFIELD'S RULE 
The degree of acceptance or rejection accorded a rule of evi-
dence may itself be an important factor in the determination of the 
validity of the rule. For example, a trend toward the repudiation 
of a rule might suggest that it is not in harmony with contemporary 
policy. Such trends are particularly crucial to rules such as that of 
Lord Mansfield, the rationale for which rests not on some circum-
stantial reliability of the testimony but on external public policy.30 
Courts have conflicted in their assessments of the validity of the 
rule. Recently it has been described as "the almost universa] 
rule,"40 "largely repudiated,"41 and a rule for which "there is as yet 
no clear trend of decision."42 An examination of state law revea]s 
that the present status of the rule lies somewhere between the two 
latter characterizations. 
Fifteen states43 apply the rule without regard to the kind of ac-
tion in which legitimacy is at issue.44 However, the rule is suspect 
in three of those states, because of cases that either avoided the appli-
cation of the rule or failed to consider it in circumstances where it 
would have been relevant. 45 In eight jurisdictions statutes have mod-
39. "Rules that exclude evidence bearing directly on the truth to be determined 
ought not to survive without very good cause." Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603, 
607 (Tex. 1975). Accord, In re L-, 499 S.W.2d 490,493 (Mo. 1973) (en bane). 
40. Gibbons v. Maryland Cas. Co., 114 Ga. App. 788, 799, 152 S.E.2d 815, 822 
(1966) (Frankum, J., dissenting). 
41. Melvin v. Kazhe, 83 N.M. 356, 357, 492 P.2d 138, 139 (1971), 
42. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 15 Mich. App. 607, 614, 167 N.W.2d 114, 118 (1969). 
43. Alabama [Franks v. State, 26 Ala. App. 430, 433, 161 So. 549, 551 (1935)], 
Alaska [Harkrader v. Reed, 5 Alas. 668, 671, (1917), affd., 264 F. 834, 835 (9th 
Cir. 1920)), Arkansas [Kennedy v. State, 117 Ark. 113, 116, 173 S.W. 842, 843 
(1915)], Iowa [Craven v. Selway, 216 Iowa 505, 508, 246 N.W. 821, 823 (1933)), 
Kansas [Stillie v. Stillie, 129 Kan. 19, 23, 281 P. 925, 927 (1929), affd. 011 rehearing, 
130 Kan. 299, 300, 286 P. 394, 395 (1930)], Kentucky [Dudley's Admr. v. Fidelity & 
Deposit Co., 240 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Ky. 1951)], Louisiana [Lewis v. Powell, 178 So. 
2d 769, 770-71 (La. -Ct. App. 1965)], Nebraska [Ford v. Ford, 191 Neb. 548, 550, 
216 N.W.2d 176, 177 (1974)], New Hampshire [State ex rel. Dolloff v. Sargent, 100 
N.H. 29, 31-32, 118 A.2d 596, 598 (1955)], North Carolina [Eubanks v. Eubanks, 
273 N.C. 189, 197, 159 S.E.2d 562, 568 (1968)), Oklahoma [Bell v. Territory, 8 
Okla. 75, 81, 56 P. 853, 855 (1899)], Oregon [Burke v. Burke, 216 Ore. 691, 697, 340 
P.2d 948, 951 (1959); but see ORE. REV. STAT. § 109.060 (Supp. 1975), which abro-
gates the concept of illegitimacy and thus possibly renders the rule superfluous], South 
Carolina [Barr's Next of Kin v. Cherokee, Inc., 220 S.C. 447, 462-64, 68 S.E.2d 
440, 447 (1951)], Utah [Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 395-96, 518 P.2d 687, 689 
(1974)], and West Virginia [Ohlinger v. Roush, 119 W. Va. 272, 276, 193 S.E. 328, 
329-30 (1937)). 
44. But see note 53 infra concerning the widespread acceptance of the Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of SUpport Act. 
45. The states are Alabama, Alaska, and Oklahoma. Until recently, the rule was 
suspect in Michigan. 
In Smith v. Smith, 268 Ala. 348, 106 So. 2d 260 (1958), and Donahey v. Dona-
hey, 52 Ala. App. 596, 296 So. 2d 188 (1974), it appears that the nominal fathers 
were permitted to testify to nonaccess, but the Alabama courts held that there was 
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ified the rule so that the testimonial disability exists only in certain 
situations. 46 The courts of fourteen states and the District of Colum-
bia have either refused to adopt the rule or have repudiated their 
insufficient proof to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. 
Harkrader v. Reed, 5 Alas. 668 (1917), affd., 264 F. 834 (9th Cir. 1920), is 
the only Alaska case to consider the rule. The discussion of the applicability of 
the rule might be characterized as dictum because the case turned on the existence 
of a valid marriage, not on the fact of access. 
In Serafin v. Serafin, 67 Mich. App. 517, 241 N.W.2d 272, motion for leave 
to appeal granted, 392 Mich. 889 (1976), the Michigan Court of Appeals found 
the assessment of child support, where the husband's nonaccess testimony had been 
excluded, to be an unconstitutional taking of property. 67 Mich. App. at 522, 241 
N.W.2d at 275. The court found that the exclusion of such evidence denied the 
plaintiff a fair opportunity to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. 67 Mich. App. at 
525, 241 N.W. at 275. Though the court stated that the justification for the rule 
was no longer compelling, it expressly declined to overturn the rule. 67 Mich. App. 
at 527, 241 N.W.2d at 276-77. The Michigan Supreme Court then rejected the 
rule and affirmed the opinion on other grounds. No. 58211 (Mich., filed Oct. 24, 
1977). 
In Austin v. Austin, 418 P.2d 347 (Okla. 1966), and Greenwood v. Greenwood, 
387 P.2d 615 (Okla. 1963), Oklahoma courts received nonaccess testimony without 
comment. 
46. The states are California, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
York, Tennessee, and Vermont. 
In California, if the husband and wife cohabited during the period of conception, 
and the husband was not impotent or sterile, there is a conclusive presumption of 
legitimacy. CAL. Evm. Coon § 621 (West Supp. 1976). If the couple did not co-
habit, evidence may be offered to rebut the presumption, CAL. Civ. Coon § 7004 
(West Supp. 1976), and the spouses may testify to nonaccess. Estate of McNamara, 
181 Cal. 82, 100, 183 P. 552, 559 (1919). 
In an Illinois paternity suit, the mother is competent to testify to nonaccess. See 
People ex rel. Cullison v. Dile, 347 Ill. 23, 179 N.E. 93 (1931) (holding that the 
husband may not so testify); ILL. RBv. STAT. ch. 106¾, § 56 (1973). Illinois courts 
have extended the rule to allow the husband to present nonaccess testimony. People 
ex rel. Jones v. Schmitt, 101 Ill. App. 2d 183, 185, 242 N.E.2d 275, 276 (1968). 
Lord Mansfield's Rule, however, apparently has not been confronted by Illinois courts 
in the context of divorce. 
The mother is competent to testify to nonaccess in an Indiana paternity proceed-
ing. Evans v. State ex rel. Freeman, 165 Ind. 369, 75 N:E. 651 (1905); IND. Coon 
§ 31-4-1-16 (1971). Though it appears that nonaccess testimony will be received 
in divorce suits, Indiana courts have refused to permit uncorroborated nonaccess testi-
mony to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. See Buchanan v. Buchanan, 256 
Ind. 119, 123, 267 N.E.2d 155, 157 (1971). 
In a Maryland paternity suit, both husband and wife may testify to nonaccess 
once independent testimony establishes that they were not cohabiting at the probable 
time of conception. Mo. ANN. Coon art. 16, § 66F(b) (repl. vol. 1973). Maryland 
courts have extended this rule to divorce cases. Staley v. Staley, 25 Md. App. 99, 
335 A.2d 114 (1975). 
Testimony of nonaccess is permitted in Massachusetts paternity and nonsupport 
actions. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 273, § 7 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1968). Such testi-
mony, however, is not allowed in divorce cases. Sayles v. Sayles, 323 Mass. 66, 80 
N.E.2d 21 (1948). 
In New York, nonaccess testimony is received only in paternity suits. Commis-
sioner of Pub. Welfare ex rel. Vincent v. Koehler, 284 N.Y. 260, 265, 30 N.E.2d 
587, 590 (1940); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 531 (McKinney 1975). It is apparently 
not admitted in divorce cases. See 284 N.Y. at 265, 30 N.E.2d at 591 (dictum). 
Both husband and wife are competent to testify to nonaccess in Tennessee pa-
ternity suits. TENN. CoDB ANN.§ 36-227 (Supp. 1976). 
Both the husband and wife may testify to all matters in a Vermont divorce case. 
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earlier adherence to it. 47 Seven states48 and the United King-
dom49-the birthplace of the rule-have abrogated it by statute. 
Six jurisdictions either have not confronted the rule or have expressly 
declined to consider its application. 5° Finally, rule 601 of the Fed-
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1604 (1973). A predecessor statute was so interpreted 
in Adams v. Adams, 102 Vt. 318, 148 A. 287 (1930). 
47. Colorado [Vasquez v. Esquibel, 141 Colo, 5, 346 P.2d 293 (1959)], Connecti-
cut [Hartford Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. Prince, 28 Conn. Supp. 348, 261 A.2d 287 
(Super. Ct. 1968)], Florida [In re Estate of Jerrido, 339 So. 2d 237, 239 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1976)], Georgia [Gibbons v. Maryland Cas. Co., 114 Ga. App. 788, 152 
S.E.2d 815 (1966)], Idaho [Alber v. Alber, 93 Idaho 755, 472 P.2d 321 (1970)], 
Maine [Ventresco v. Bushey, 159 Me. 241, 191 A.2d 104 (1963)], Michigan [Sera-
fin v. Serafin, No. 58211 (Mich., filed Oct. 24, 1977)], Mississippi [Moore v. Smith, 
178 Miss. 383, 172 So. 317 (1937)], Missouri [In re L-, 499 S.W.2d 490 
(Mo. 1973) (en bane)], New Jersey [Loudon v. Loudon, 114 N.J. Eq. 242, 168 
A. 840 (1933)], New Mexico [Melvin v. Kazhe, 83 N.M. 356, 492 P.2d 138 (1971)], 
Ohio [Yerian v. Brinker, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 591, 35 N.E.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1941)], 
Pennsylvania [Commonwealth ex rel. Savruk v. Derby, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 560, 344 
A.2d 624 (1975)], Texas [Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1975)], District of 
Columbia [Peters v. District of Columbia, 84 A.2d 115 (D.C. 1951 )1. 
California has also rejected the rule in those cases in which the presumption 
is rebuttable. See note 46 supra. 
48. These states are Delaware, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, South Da-
kota, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
Delaware has enacted a statute expressly permitting spousal access testimony. 
See DEL, CODE tit. 13, § 508 (1974). 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Montana permit such testimony 
based on judicial construction of statutes concerning legitimacy. ,Jn State v. Fury, 
53 N.D. 333, 205 N.W. 877 (1925), a statute permitting proof of legitimacy, N.D, 
CENT. CODE § 14-09-03 (rep!. vol. 1971), was construed to allow admission of 
spousal nonaccess testimony. Illegitimate status, however, has since been abrogated 
by legislative action. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-10(2) (Supp. 1975). S.D. 
CoMPILED LAWS ANN. § ·25-5-4 (1976) was found to allow spousal nonaccess testi-
mony in In re Kessler's Estate, 76 S.D. 158, 74 N.W.2d 599 (1956). Wis. STAT. 
ANN. § 891.39 ( 1 )(a) (West Supp. 1973) was given the same interpretation in 
Schmidt v. Schmidt, 21 Wis. 2d 433, 124 N.W.2d 569 (1963). A similar statute, 
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 5832 (1921), was found to abrogate Lord Mansfield's 
Rule in In re Wray's Estate, 93 Mont. 525, 19 P.2d 1051 (1933). Although the 
court retained a conclusive presumption of legitimacy "when the parents have been 
cohabiting during the period of conception," 93 Mont. at 536, 19 P.2d at 1054, Mon-
tana's recent adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act, replacing the aforementioned 
statute, casts doubt upon any holding of a conclusive presumption of legitimacy. See 
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 61-305, 61-313 (Supp. 1975). 
Minnesota and Washington courts have held that Lord Mansfield's Rule has been 
abrogated by general competency statutes requiring only that witnesses be of sound 
mind and suitable age and discretion. See State v. Soyka, 188 Minn. 533, 233 N,W. 
300 (1930) (construing predecessor statute of MINN. STAT. ANN, § 595.02 (Supp, 
1916)); In re Adoption of a Minor, 29 Wash. 2d 759, 189 P.2d 458 (1958) (en 
bane) (interpreting predecessor statute of WASH, REv. CODE § 5.60.020 (1974) ). 
49. "Notwithstanding any rule of law, the evidence of a husband or wife shall 
be admissible in any proceedings to prove that marital intercourse did or did not 
take place between them during any period." Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provi-
sions) Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 100, § 7-(1). 
50. The jurisdictions are Arizona, Hawaii, Nevada, Rhode Island, Virginia, and 
,Wyoming. 
The rule does not appear to have been considered by the Arizona courts. See 
State v. Mejia, 97 Ariz. 215, 399 P.2d 116 (1965) (en bane), a paternity action 
in which nonaccess testimony apparently was received without comment. Acceptance 
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eral Rules of Evidence apparently rejects Lord Mansfield's Rule, 
though application of rule 601 is subject to the law of the forum if 
state law supplies a substantive rule of decision. 51 
Even those states embracing Lord Mansfield's Rule have pro-
vided statutory exceptions for certain classes of cases. Virtually 
every state has adopted section 22 of the Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act, 52 which permits spouses to testify to non-
access in multi-state support actions. 53 Similar provisions are found 
in the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act54 and the Uniform Par-
of the rule would be pointless in view of the state's abolition of the status of illegiti-
macy. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 8-601 (Supp. 1975). 
Hawaii courts regard the acceptance of the rule as an open matter. Estate of 
Cunha, 49 Hawaii 273, 302-03, 414 P.2d 925, 941 (1966). 
There are no Nevada cases discussing the rule, but it has been endorsed by the 
attorney general of that state. See [1950-52] NEV. A'rIY. GEN. BIENNIAL REP. No. 93, 
at 222. 
In T_ v. T_, 216 Va. 867, 224 S.E.2d 148 (1976), the Virginia trial court 
had admitted nonaccess testimony based on statutory interpretation. The Supreme 
Court of Virginia never reached this issue, however, as it reversed the case on other 
grounds. A husband's nonaccess testimony apparently was admitted without com-
ment in Gibson v. Gibson, 207 Va. 821, 824, 153 S.E.2d 189, 191 (1967). It has 
been suggested that Bowles v. Bingham, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 442 (1811), indicated 
that Virginia had adopted Lord Mansfield's Rule. See State ex rel. Worley v. Laven-
der, 147 W. Va. 803, 810, 131 S.E.2d 752, 756 (1963). 
No Rhode Island or Wyoming cases have confronted the rule. 
51. FED. R. Evm. 601, as proposed by the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evi-
dence and prescribed by the Supreme Court, simply provided that "[e]very person 
is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules." RULES 
OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES CoURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 56 F.R.D. 183, 261 
(1972). This apparent rejection of Lord Mansfield's Rule by omission is analogous 
to rule 60l's rejection of the Dead Man's Acts. See Advisory Committee's Note 
to Proposed Rule 601, id. at 262. However, Congress amended rule 601 by adding: 
"However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim 
or defense as to which state law supplies the rule of decision, the competency of 
a witness shall be determined in accordance with State law." Pub. L. 93-595, § 
1, 88 Stat. 1934 (1975). Yet, to the extent the Federal Rules of Evidence are 
adopted by the states, the notion that Lord Mansfield's Rule has been rejected by 
omission could allow a judicial interpretation that the rule has been abolished by 
rule 601. 
52. 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 383, 399 (Master ed. Supp. 1974-76). 
53. The pertinent part of § 22 states that "[h]usband and wife are competent 
witnesses (and may be compelled) to testify to any relevant matter including mar-
riage and parentage." 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 862, 922 (Master ed. 1973). Of 
the states accepting Lord Mansfield's Rule, only Iowa omits this section. IOWA CODE 
ANN. §§ 252A.1-.12 (1969 & Supp. 1976). Though § 22 was apparently ignored 
in Neff v. Johnson, 391 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965), it has been sug-
gested that the language of the section abrogates the rule regardless of whether the 
action is of a multistate character. See State er rel. Dolloff v. Sargent, 100 N.H. 
29, 34, 118 A.2d 596, 599-600 (1955) (Kenison, C.J., dissenting in part). Otherwise, 
application of the act in a state adopting the rule might permit a nonresident de-
fendant husband to give nonaccess testimony while a resident husband would be 
barred from doing so. See Commonwealth ex rel. Leider v. Leider, 210 Pa. Super. 
Ct. 433,440,233 A.2d 917, 920 (1967) (Hoffman, J., dissenting). 
54. UNIFORM Civu. Lwin.ITY FOR SUPPORT Acr § 10, reported in 9 UNIFORM 
LAws ANN. 142 (Master ed. 1973). Though Utah has adopted this provision, it 
continues to recognize Lord Mansfield's Rule. Compare UTAH CoDE ANN. § 78-
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entage Act. 55 
The ambit of testimony within the rule's prohibition has also 
been narrowly confined in most states. Though spousal testimony 
of nonaccess is consistently excluded, the spouses are permitted to 
testify to facts from which nonaccess can be inferred. 5° Also, the 
testimony of nonaccess is admitted if its effect will not be to bas-
tardize the child, 57 except in three states that embrace a broader ver-
sion of the rule that excludes all spousal testimony tending to bas-
tardize the child, whether it concerns nonaccess or other facts. tSs 
The foregoing information is significant in several respects. 
Clearly the rule can no longer be said to have the support of a major-
ity of jurisdictions. Even where it is accepted, it is limited to certain 
types of cases, and the testimony to which it applies is narrowly de-
fined. Furthermore, there is a distinct trend toward the complete 
abrogation of the rule. 59 In conjunction with this trend, it should 
be noted that, although the leading commentators of the nineteenth 
century accepted the rule without much discussion, 00 "no modern 
text on the law of evidence supports [the rule]."61 Consequently, 
45-11 (Supp. 1975) with Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 518 P.2d 687 (1974). 
55. UNIFORM PARENTAGE Acr § 12, reported in 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 369 
(Master ed. Supp. 1977). 
56. See Franks v. State, 26 Ala. App. 430, 433, 161 So. 549, 551 (1935); Wallace 
v. Wallace, 137 Iowa 37, 47, 114 N.W. 527, 531 (1908). Though such facts may 
ultimately help establish illegitimacy, spousal testimony might include the time and 
fact of marriage, the date of the child's birth, and other independent facts. Cairgle 
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 366 Pa. 249, 257, 77 A.2d 439, 
442-43 (1951). 
57. In Commonwealth ex rel. Leider v. Leider, 434 Pa. 293, 254 A.2d 306 
(1969), nonaccess testimony was permitted because the subsequent marriage of the 
parents had the effect of legitimating the child. This was allowed despite the moth-
er's marriage to another man at the time of the child's birth and Pennsylvania's 
acceptance of Lord Mansfield's Rule. For similar cases, see Shatford v. Shatford, 
214 Ark. 612, 217 S.W.2d 917 (1949); Dudley's Admr. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 
240 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1951); In re Wright's Estate, 237 Mich. 375, 211 N.W. 746 
(1927). 
58. The states are Nebraska [Zutavern v. Zutavern, 155 Neb. 395, 404, 52 N.W. 
2d 254, 260 (1952)], South Carolina [Barr's Next of Kin v. Cherokee, Inc., 220 S.C. 
447, 463, 68 S.E.2d 440, 447 (1951)], and West Virginia [Ohlinger v. Roush, 119 
W. Va. 272, 276, 193 S.E. 328, 330 (1937)]. 
59. Compare Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 212 (1973) with Annot., 60 A.L.R. 380 
(1929). Of the fifteen jurisdictions that have abrogated the rule by judicial opin-
ion, eight have done so in the last decade. See note 47 supra. 
60. See 2 w. BEST, ThIB PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 996 (1st Am. 
ed. 1875); 1 J. BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARA· 
TION § 1179 (1891); 2 S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 
151, at 134 (16th rev. ann. ed. 1899); J. LAWSON, THE LAW OF PRESUMPTIVE EVI-
DENCE 118 (1886); F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 
ISSUES § 518, at 424 (8th ed. 188'0'). 
61. State e.r: rel. Dolloff v. Sargent, 100 N.Y. 29, 34, 118 A.2d 596, 600 (1955) 
(Kenison, C.J., dissenting in part). A review of leading authorities on evidence 
and domestic relations confirms opposition to the rule. See 2 F. CHAMBERLAYNB, 
A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1089e, at 1341-42 (1911); H. 
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courts can no longer resort to a "weight of authority" argument to 
justify adherence to the rule. 
More important, the fact that jurisdictions are moving away 
from Lord Mansfield's Rule indicates that the assumptions under-
lying the continued application of the rule are dubious. A rule of 
evidence that is justified solely on considerations of social policy re-
tains its validity only so long as the relevant societal characteristics 
that legitimate the rule remain unchanged.62 To the extent that so-
cietal norms have changed since the promulgation of the rule in 
1777, and to the degree that these new norms do not require this 
evidentiary rule to achieve present policy objectives, the judicial sys-
tem is burdened with an obsolete rule. Therefore, the policy con-
siderations supporting the rule must be reexamined in light of con-
temporary standards. 
ill. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POLICIES SUPPORTING 
LORD MANSFIELD'S RULE 
Lord Mansfield himself failed to articulate specifically the public 
policy63 upon which his rule of evidence rested. A survey of deci-
sions, however, reveals recurring definitions of public policy that as-
sertedly support the rule. First, the rule is thought to protect against 
the breakdown of the marital and parent-child role models in our 
society. 6' Second, it is believed necessary to minimize the burdens 
imposed on society by wards of the state. 65 Third, it is contended 
that the rule operates to protect the best interests of the child. 66 
CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESI1C RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 13.7, at 398 
(1968); J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 91 (1947); 
McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 67, at 146; 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2064, at 
369. 
62. See note 38 supra and accompanying text; note 63 infra. 
63. "Public policy" is used here as a generic term incorporating all reasons given 
by the courts for following Lord Mansfield's Rule. The term conveys the central 
fact that the rule is based on societal considerations that override the public interest 
in allowing litigants to secure reliable evidence. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, 
§ 2175, at 1. Most American jurisdictions accepting the rule do so on the basis 
of Mansfield's grounqs of decency, morality, and policy. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 
212, 231 (1973). Although attempts have been made to analyze those components 
separately, see, e.g., 1 J. WIGMORE, supra, note 2, § 2064, a judicial determination 
of decency and morality is really nothing more than a determination of societal pol-
icy. Also, one may cite cogent reasons for the rule outside of the traditional Mans-
field rationale. Thus, in order to accommodate all considerations behind the rule 
and to emphasize its societal policy nature, the term "public policy" will be used 
to denote all justifications for the rule. 
It should be noted that the cases presented in the remainder of this discussion 
are not necessarily indicative of the status of the rule in the various jurisdictions. 
The cases are used to demonstrate the arguments advanced for and against the rule. 
64. See text at notes 68-86 infra. 
65. See text at notes 87-100 infra. 
66. See text at notes 101-48 infra. 
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Finally, it may be claimed that the rule prevents unreliable testi-
mony. 67 It is shown in this section that each of these rationales is 
deficient in the context of modem societal values. 
A. The Protection of Familial Role Models 
Lord Mansfield's Rule is often justified by the assertion that the 
public admission of nonaccess testimony would tend to encourage 
deviation from the socially accepted norms concerning husband-wife 
and parent-child relationships. 68 Courts regard this argument as 
having more than merely passing sociological importance. It may 
be inferred from the language of many opinions that many judges 
possess a highly idealistic view of family institutions that can emo-
tionally influence them to support the rule. 69 
Somewhat like the spousal privilege against revealing confi-
dential marital communications, 70 one purpose of excluding nonaccess 
testimony under the rule is to preserve society's trust in the marital 
institution. It is considered unseemly that the details of marital sex 
lives should be publicly disclosed and that the institution of marriage 
be impugned by the implication that the child is the result of a part-
ner's moral delinquency. 71 Thus, the moral fiber of the entire com-
munity is supposedly protected by concealing marital behavior con-
trary to the socially preferred prototype. 72 
A second aspect of the social-norm argument concerns the del-
eterious effect nonaccess testimony may have on the parent-child 
67. See text at notes 149-51 infra. 
68. The courts' use of the "social norm" argument has focused on the impact 
of nonaccess testimony on society's ideal image of marital and parent-child relation-
ships. See text at notes 69-75 infra. The same rationale might be advanced with 
the emphasis on the impact of the evidence on the child, particularly since the parents 
are tho source of this bastardizing testimony. The analysis of the "social norm" 
argument here deals with its effectiveness and consistency in supporting the applica-
tion of the rule to avoid a detrimental effect on the institution of marriage and 
on the parent-child relationship. 
69. For example, emotional reaction appears to outweigh legal reasoning in Jus-
tice Henriod's concurring opinion affirming application of the rule in Lopes v. Lopes, 
30 Utah 2d 393, 396, 518 P.2d 687, 690 ( 1974): "[In concurring,] I am constrained 
to say that in cases like this the children are not the bastards, but you know who." 
One court seemed divorced from reality when it observed that under the rule, "[n)o 
one . . . can malign the virtue of the mother, and no one . . . can interrupt the 
harmony of the family relationship and undermine the sanctity of the home." 
Craven v. Selway, 216 Iowa SOS, 508,246 N.W. 821,823 (1933). 
70. See McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 86, at 172. Though the spousal confiden-
tial-communications privilege was used as an alternative justification for Lord Mans-
field's Rule in Ray v. Ray, 219 N.C. 217, 218, 13 S.E.2d 224, 226 (1941), it is 
difficult to see how the lack of sexual relations could be regarded as confidential 
communication. 
71. See Kennedy v. State, 117 Ark. 113, 116, 173 S.W. 842, 843 (1915). 
72. See Ventresco v. Bushey, 159 Me. 241,257, 191 A.2d 104, 112 (1963) (Tap-
ley, J., dissenting). 
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role model. 73 This argument concentrates on the harm to the public 
rather than the effect such testimo~y might have upon a particular 
parent and child. Society, so the argument goes, should not witness 
such challenges to its norms as allegations by parents that their chil-
dren are illegitimate.74 The attempted dissolution of the parent-
child bond is viewed as a betrayal that adversely affects the public 
concept of the family.75 
However, Lord Mansfield's Rule fails to insure the achievement 
of either end advocated by the social-norm argument. First, the rule 
is ineffective because other evidence is admissible that is at least as 
destructive of these norms. Lord Mansfield's Rule prohibits only 
direct spousal testimony of nonaccess; spousal testimony from which 
nonaccess can be inferred has been widely permitted.76 For ex-
ample, where relevant, the law of evidence in virtually all jurisdic-
tions77 permits testimony of adultery--even where nonaccess testi-
mony is prohibited: 
Testimony by the husband that his wife has had sexual relations 
with every man in town can be given . . . but he is not permitted 
to say that he was in the jungles of New Guinea during the two 
years prior to the birth of his wife's child and that he never saw 
her during that period of time. That would be scandalous!78 
Consequently, the invocation of Lord Mansfield's Rule fails to pre-
vent the disparagement of the marital institutional model because it 
does not exclude testimony that may be even more deleterious than 
that which is excluded. 79 
73. This proposition was raised in Hubert v. Cloutier, 135 Me. 230, 232, 194 
A. 303, 305 (1937), parts of which were overruled in Ventresco v. Bushey, 159 
Me. 241, 191 A.2d 104 (1963). 
74. While the effect on the child is an important justification advanced in support 
of the rule, it is not a part of this rationale. For a discussion of the argument 
addressing the best interests of the child, see note 105 infra. 
75. "That the parents should be permitted to bastardize the child,.is a proposition 
which shocks our sense of right and decency and hence the rule of law which forbids 
it." Tioga County v. South Creek Township, 75 Pa. 433, 437 (1874). To a degree, 
this reaction against such testimony may emphasize the source of such information 
rather than the in1pact of the testimony. See note 68 supra. 
16. See note 56 supra; Note, The Presumption of Legitimacy as Affected by 
Standing, Antenuptial Conception, and the Lord Mansfield Rule, 24 U. MIAMI L. 
RBV. 414, 421 (1970). 
77. See 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2063, at 367. However, in Nebraska, South 
Carolina, and West Virginia the rule is construed broadly to exclude any testimony 
tending to bastardize the child. See note 58 supra and accompanying text. 
78. Lopes v. Lopes, 3·0 Utah 2d 393, 396, 518 P.2d 687, 690 (1974) (Ellett, 
J., concurring and dissenting). 
79. Dean Wigmore was among the first of the leading commentators to criticize 
the rule because of the inconsistency in permitting testimony of adultery while pro-
hibiting nonaccess testimony. See 1 J. WmMoRE, supra note 2, § 2064, at 368. 
For similar criticisms, see Hartford Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. Prince, 28 Conn. 
Supp. 348, 352, 261 A.2d 287, 289 (Super. Ct. 1968); Peters v. District of Columbia, 
84 A.2d 115, 119 (D.C. 1951). 
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When it is remembered that the rule is only infrequently of con-
sequence in an action, 80 the inconsistency between the desired end 
of preserving societal norms by excluding nonaccess testimony and 
the practical result of permitting "indecent" testimony in all but .a 
very few instances becomes manifest. 81 Of course, it could be con-
tended that the rule is valuable as a partial safeguard of societal 
norms, i.e., some restraint on indecent testimony is better than none. 
However, such a limited benefit seems hardly a sufficient justifica-
tion for a rule that excludes probative testimony possibly determina-
tive of the cause of action. 82 
Similar criticisms may be directed at the argument that Lord 
Mansfield's Rule prevents the disparagement of society's image of 
the parent-child relationship. There are many other ways for 
spouses to bastardize their children and to impugn the parent-child 
role model than by offering nonaccess testimony.83 Certainly the 
admission of facts from which nonaccess can be inferred may accom-
plish the same end. 84 Furthermore, many courts admit nonaccess 
testimony in cases in which there will be no res judicata effect on 
the legitimacy of the child. 85 However, the absence of a conclusive 
finding of illegitimacy does not lessen whatever impact testimony of 
adultery or of nonaccess might have on the public. Once again, the 
use of the rule in legitimacy cases may be seen as a fruitless attempt 
to achieve a policy that would be totally ignored if the evidence were 
of a different form or came from a different source.86 The rule thus 
fails effectively to conceal socially undesirable paradigms of the 
marital and parent-child relationships. 
80. See note 13 supra; note 56 supra and accompanying text. 
81. Like Lord Mansfield's Rule, the evidentiary privilege regarding confidential 
spousal communications, see note 70 supra, has the purpose of maintaining respect 
for the institution of marriage. That end is uniformly achieved by the spousal privi-
lege that excludes all confidential communications. Under Lord Mansfield's Rule, 
however, only direct spousal testimony of nonaccess is excluded while testimony 
about equally "indecent" matters such as adultery is allowed. See text at notes 76-
78 supra. 
82. See Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603, 607 (Tex. 1975). 
83. See In re L-, 499 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Mo. 1973) (en bane). 
84. See notes 77-79 supra and accompanying text. 
85. See Monahan v. Monahan, 142 Me. 72, 46 A.2d 706 (1946); note 57 supra 
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the circumstances necessary to give 
res judicata effect to a determination of a child's legal status, see Comment, Res 
ludicata and Paternity, 37 CoLO. L. REV. 479 (1965). Two states have addressed 
this problem by enacting laws declaring that a divorce decree cannot be a conclusive 
adjudication of the child's status. See MAss. ANN. LA.ws ch. 208, § 25 (Michie/Law. 
Co-op 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (1976). In both states, however, the 
statutes apparently have not affected the imposition of Lord Mansfield's Rule, 
even though the potential for a decree of illegitimacy is eliminated. 
86. For an application of these criticisms to the rationale that the rule should 
be invoked because a child is peculiarly affected because his parent is the source 
of such bastardizing testimony, see note 68 supra. 
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B. Minimization of Public Support of Illegitimate Children 
Another rationale advanced in favor of Lord Mansfield's Rule 
is the public policy against the judicial creation of wards to be sup-
ported by the state. Excluding the nonaccess testimony of spouses 
purportedly lessens the number of children declared illegitimate, and 
this in turn supposedly reduces the number of public charges be-
cause the husband or nominal father is not relieved of his support 
obligation. 87 Such an analysis may have been reasonable in Lord 
Mansfield's time, when the legal burden of supporting an illegitimate 
child initially fell not upon the natural father88 but rather upon the 
parish, which could seek but rarely would receive any indemnifica-
tion from the true father.89 It may also have been reasonable in 
the United States in the early nineteenth. century, when a similar 
common-law structure was used to provide public support. 00 
Modern statutory paternity procedures stand in sharp contrast to 
the old English parish-indemnification process. First, statutes in 
most states permit the mother to bring an action directly against the 
putative father for support of the child. 91 Furthermore, where the 
child is otherwise likely to become a public charge, many states per-
mit public-welfare authorities to initiate the action. 92 Thus, today's 
system is oriented toward placing the initial responsibility for support 
87. In re Wright's Estate, 237 Mich. 375, 381, 211 N.W. 746, 748-49 (1927). 
88. 1 S. ScHATION, supra note 13, § 1.08, at 1-27. 
89. See R. PASHLEY, PAUPERISM AND POOR LAWS 199 (1852). The responsibility 
for support often became a contest between two unwilling parishes. See Parish of 
St. Andrews v. Parish of St. Brides, 93 Eng. Rep. 35 (K.B. 1717). The support 
of illegitimate children was a financial hardship on the residents of a parish because 
support payments did not come from general revenue funds but rather were paid 
from special levies called Poor Rates. S. WEBB & B. WEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL Gov-
ERNMENT: ENGLISH POOR LAW HISTORY: PART I. THE OLD POOR LAW 309 (1927). 
A parish officer, the Overseer of the Poor, might persuade the child's mother 
to identify the natural father, who would then be assessed an amount for the indem-
nification of the parish. But unless the putative father were one of a few wealthy 
men, there was little likelihood of enforcing the obligation. Id. Though little could 
be done to increase the effectiveness of this procedure when the mother was unmar-
ried, the problem probably was avoided for married mothers by interposing a rule 
preventing a declaration of illegitimacy and placing the obligation to support a child 
born in wedlock on the nominal father, the husband. 
90. See, e.g., Simons v. Bull, 21 Ala. 501, 504 (1852); People ex rel. Crandall 
v. Overseers of the Poor of Ontario, 15 Barb. 286 (N.Y. App. Div. 1853 ). 
91. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); H. CLARK, supra note 61, § 5.3, 
at 162 n.4. Married women are not generally precluded from bringing such suits 
even though the applicable statute may require that the suit be brought by an unmar-
ried woman. See Gammon v. Cobb, 336 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1976); H. CLARK, supra 
note 61, § 5.3, at 166 n.37. In this situation, Lord Mansfield's Rule may be used 
by the putative father to impede the mother's ability to rebut the presumption of 
legitimacy, thereby possibly avoiding the assessment to him of child-support obliga-
tions. See Commissioner of Pub. Welfare ex rel. Vincent v. Koehler, 284 N.Y. 260, 
267, 30 N.E.2d 587, 591 (1940). 
92. Wyatt, Evidence-Incompetency of a Husband and Wife To Testify as to 
Nonaccess so as To Bastardize a Child, 6 GA. ST. B.J, 448, 450 (1970). 
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on the natural father rather than on the local government, which 
would then seek indemnification. 
Under the present statutory scheme, Lord Mansfield's Rule may 
actually increase the possibility that an illegitimate child will become 
a public charge. For example, the natural father can use the rule 
as a shield to prevent the mother from introducing nonaccess testi-
mony necessary to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. If her 
husband-the nominal father-is unavailable to pay support, the 
public will be required to provide for the child. 
Another practical consideration is the ability of the putative 
father to pay support. In the rigidly stratified society of Lord Mans-
field's time, few putative fathers could afford to indemnify the par-
ish. 93 Today, the United States' relatively affluent standard of living 
makes such a situation less likely.94 Although the increased mobility 
in modem society might permit the natural father to flee in an at-
tempt to avoid the obligation of support, 05 the Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act permits multistate actions to enforce 
such indebtedness. 96 Thus, there appears to be little if any factual 
basis to support a rule, such as Lord Mansfield's Rule, that discrimi-
nates on the basis· of the presence of a marital obligation rather than 
a biological relation. 97 
Even if the putative father is unable or unwilling to pay support, 
it must also be recognized that social attitudes toward providing pub-
lic welfare have altered substantially.98 Our current legislative 
policy provides public support for children on the basis of need even 
though a nominal father is chargeable with that obligation. 0° Fur-
93. See note 89 supra. 
94. This conclusion might be disputed insofar as a disproportionate number of 
illegitimate births occur among the poor. See H. KRAUSE, ILLEGmMACY: LAw AND 
SocIAL POUCY 112 (1971). 
95. See Child Support and the Work Bonus: Hearings on S. 1842, S. 2081 Before 
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 64-68 (1973). The two bills 
attempted to meet the problem by establishing paternity testing and prosecution on 
a nationwide basis. 
It is not clear that Lord Mansfield's Rule successfully avoids placing the burden 
of support on the state through its tendency to place the burden on the nominal 
father (husband), because such a person, much like a natural father, is prone to 
flee from support obligations. See id. at 223 (statement of Jule M. Sugarman, Ad-
ministrator, Human Resources Admin., Commissioner, Dept. of Social Services, City 
of New York), 227 (response of Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare). 
96. See note 53 supra and accompanying text. 
91. See note 95 supra. 
98. See A. ACHINSTEIN, nm WELFARE STATE (Pub. Aff. Bull. No. 83, June 
1950); H. WILENSKY, nm WELFARE STATE AND EQUALITY: STRUCTURAL AND 
IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF PUBLIC ExPENDITURF.S (1975). 
99. AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) payments are generally 
not conditioned on the marital status of the head of the family. See H. KRAUSE, 
supra note 94, at 269. In 1973 over 80% of the families receiving benefits under 
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thermore, unlike the situation in England where the costs of support 
were borne by the local parish, 100 the American welfare burden to-
day is spread across the nation. Because of the economic, legal, and 
social realities of today's welfare state, the "public charge" argument 
in support of Lord Mansfield's Rule has been vitiated. 
C. Minimization of the Disabilities of Illegitimacy 
Perhaps the most cogent rationale for applying Lord Mansfield's 
Rule is the public policy to minimize the number of children stig-
matized by the disabilities that accompany a declaration of illegiti-
macy.101 The stigma is acknowledged to be twofold:102 (1) dis-
abilities that are legally imposed,103 and (2) social and economic dis-
abilities.104 Courts have maintained that the stigma of illegitimacy 
is so great that it is in the "best interests of the child"105 to provide 
the protection aff9rded even by a limited rule that restricts the evi-
dence that may be offered to rebut the presumption of legitimacy.106 
However, the "best interests of the child" rationale does not jus-
tify the imposition of the rule in all cases in which legitimacy is at 
issue. First, courts have failed to distinguish those situations where 
it is to the child's advantage to secure a decree of illegitimacy and 
thereby establish a blood relationship with the true father.107 By 
the program involved a parent purportedly subject to a support obligation. U.S. 
DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THB 
UNITED STATES: 1976, at 320 (1976). 
100. See note 89 supra and accompanying toxt. 
101. See Lewis v. Powell, 178 So. 2d 769, 771 (La. Ct. App. 1965); Common-
wealth ex rel. Leider v. Leider, 434 Pa. 293, 301, 254 A.2d 306, 310 (1969) (Bell, 
CJ., dissenting). 
102. Illegitimacy "is a matter of public opinion and attitude as well as of law." 
Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 AM. J. Soc. 215, 229 (1939). 
See Wallach & Tenoso, A Vindication of the Rights of Unmarried Mothers and Their 
Children: An Analysis of the Institution of Illegitimacy, Equal Protection, and the 
Uniform Parentage Act, 23 KAN. L. REV. 23, 24-25 (1974). 
103. For example, the child's right to inherit from the natural father may be 
jeopardized by such a declaration. See Moore v. Dague, 46 Ohio App. 2d 75, 345 
N.E.2d 449 (1975). 
104. In Kennedy v. State, 117 Ark. 113, 116, 173 S.W. 842, 843 (1915), the 
court stated that declarations of illegitimacy cast "a cloud upon the life of the unof-
fending child, and subject it to handicaps and embarrassments that are always most 
hurtful and most difficult to overcome." 
105. See Gibbons v. Maryland Cas. Co., 114 Ga. App. 788, 802-03, 152 S.E.2d 
815, 824 (1966) (Frankum, J., dissenting in part); Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 
393, 395, 518 P.2d 687, 689 (1974). As invoked by the courts, the "best interests 
of the child" rationale is generally equated with preventing a decree of illegitimacy 
regardless of the impact it may have on the real interest and intent of the child. 
See note 101 supra and accompanying text. For example, a declaration of illegiti-
macy might be financially advantageous to the child. See notes 108-09 infra and 
accompanying text. 
106. See 112 U. PA. L. REv. 613, 615 (1964). 
107. See, e.g., Craven v, Selway, 216 Iowa 505, 246 N.W. 821 (1933). 
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proving a blood tie-albeit illegitimate-to a decedent, the child 
might be entitled to statutory death benefits, 108 proceeds from an 
estate, 109 or, most commonly, benefits in a paternity suit.110 In each 
of these situations, the child may need the nonaccess testimony of 
his nominal parents in order to rebut the presumption of legitimacy 
and to prevail in establishing a legal relationship. 
These circumstances reveal that the "best interests of the child" 
justification, at the very least, does not support a universal applica-
tion of Lord Mansfield's Rule. Some states recognize this problem 
and refuse to apply the rule in paternity cases, m and the Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act112 allows nonaccess testi-
mony because the child will ultimately benefit from the assess-
ment of support payments. Even commentators generally favoring 
the rule have suggested that it be relaxed in cases in which it fails 
to benefit the child.113 Thus, if the rationale for the rule is to 
promote the best interests of the child, it should be selectively applied 
so as not to deny benefits to the individual whose legitimacy is at 
issue.114 
Even a selective application of the rule, however, can be criti-
cized in light of modern legal and social attitudes toward illegitimacy. 
Incapacities related to illegitimacy have largely been removed since 
Lord Mansfield's time. 1111 In 1968 the Supreme Court held that a 
108. See, e.g., Ingalls Shipbuilding Co. v. Neuman, 322 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D. 
Miss. 1970) (workers' compensation benefits granted to children; nonaccess testi-
mony allowed in rejection of Lord Mansfield's Rule); Barr's Next of Kin v. Chero-
kee, Inc., 220 S.C. 447, 58 S.E.2d 440 (1951) (workmen's compensation benefits 
not awarded; nonaccess testimony not allowed). 
109. ~ee, e.g., In re Kessler's Estate, 76 S.D. 158, 74 N.W.2d 599 (1956) (child 
established as heir; bastardizing testimony allowed); Craven v. Selway, 216 Iowa 
505, 246 N.W. 821 (1933) (child denied proceeds of estate; nonaccess testimony 
not allowed). 
110. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Savruk v. Derby, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 560, 
344 A.2d 624 (1975). 
111. The states are Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New York, and Tennessee. 
See note 46 supra. 
112. See notes 52-53 supra. 
113. See Bell, Competency of a Husband and Wife To Testify as to Non-Access, 
21 TEMP. L.Q. 217, 222 (1947). 
114. Under this theory, the rule would usually not be applied in death benefit, 
heirship, or paternity cases in which the nonaccess testimony would be of assistance 
in granting the child financial support. Generally, the rule would prevent nonaccess 
testimony in divorce cases where the child might lose support rights. Id. at 220-
22. 
115. See Serafin v. Serafin, 67 Mich. App. 517, 525, 241 N.W.2d 272, 276 (1976), 
atfd. on other grounds, No. 58211 (Mich., filed Oct. 24, 1977); Commonwealth ex 
rel. Savruk v. Derby, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 560, 565-66, 344 A.2d 624, 627 (1975). 
But see H. CLARK, supra note 61, § 5.4, at 180. 
At common law the bastard child was f ilius nullius-the child of no one. The 
principal discrimination was in the area of property rights. The child was accorded 
no right of support from either parent. 1 S. ScHATKIN, supra note 13, § 1.08, at 
1-27. While the child could inherit from the mother, property could not pass to 
June 1977] Lord Mansfield's Rule 1475 
Louisiana statute barring an acknowledged116 illegitimate child from 
recovering for the wrongful death of a natural parent was invalid as 
a denial of equal protection.117 In subsequent cases the Court estab-
lished that illegitimates were entitled to workers' compensation 
benefits,118 public assistance,119 social security benefits,120 an oppor-
tunity in some circumstances to demonstrate both paternity and their 
right as an heir to inherit from a deceased putative father,121 and 
the right of their mothers to bring an action for the illegitimate child's 
wrongful death.122 With only one significant exception, illegitimate 
children are accorded almost the same rights as legitimate chil-
dren.123 
the child through the mother from her relatives. See H. C:uRx, supra note 61, 
§ 5.4, at 179. There was no right to inheritance from the father at all. Id. Further-
more, illegitimates were often precluded from maintaining actions for the wrongful 
death of a parent, see Board of Commrs. v. City of New Orleans, 223 La. 199, 
65 So. 2d 313 (1953), or for statutory benefits such as workers' compensation 
survival benefits. See Wieczoreck v. Folsom, 142 F. Supp. 507 (D.N.J. 1956). 
Statutory exceptions later reduced the legal deficiency in the area of support. 
See note 91 supra and accompanying text. Also, many states now permit the child 
to inherit through the mother from her relatives. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
§ 2-101 (West 4th ed. 19-75); Annot., 97 AL.R.2d 1101 (1964). 
116. "Acknowledgement" consists of an admission of paternity by the natural 
father or acts constituting an admission, such as giving support. H. CLARK, supra 
note 61, § 5.2, at 158-60. 
117. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (19-68). Although the Court·did not desig-
nate illegitimacy as a suspect classification, it found no rational basis for the state's 
action in statutorily discriminating against acknowledged bastard children. 
118. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (19-72). 
119. New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973). 
120. Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. 
Supp. 588 (D. Conn.), affd., 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). See Semmel, Social Security 
Benefits for Illegitimate Children After Levy v. Louisiana, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 289 
(1970). But see Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), discussed in note 125 
and accompanying text. 
121. Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S .. Ct. 1459 (1977). This case involved the ability 
of the decedent-father's illegitimate daughter to share in the estate under an Illinois 
statute that permitted illegitimates to inherit only from the mother. The decedent 
had been adjudged the father in a paternity suit prior to his death, and he had been 
supporting the child. The Supreme Court overturned the statute because the statu-
tory classification extended beyond the legitimate state interest in protecting the in-
testate distribution process from spurious paternity claims: "Difficulties of proving 
paternity in some situations do not justify the total statutory disinheritance of illegiti-
mate children whose fathers die intestate." 97 S. Ct. at 1466. The Court distin-
guished Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), in which it had upheld a prohibition 
against illegitimates inheriting from their fathers, on the ground that the Louisiana 
statute in that case permitted inheritance where the father had "acknowledged" the 
child. 97 S. Ct. at 1464 n.13. See note 116 supra. Despite its refusal to overrule 
Labine, the court took a significant step in that direction by its suggestion that the 
interest of the state in encouraging the institution of the family is insufficient to jus-
tify the complete disinheritance of illegitimate offspring: ''The parents have the ability 
to conform their conduct to societal norms, but their illegitimate children can affect 
neither their parents' conduct nor their own status." 97 S. Ct. at 1465. 
122. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
123. The Court has refused to find legitimate-illegitimate classifications to be 
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The remaining legal disability of major consequence to illegiti-
mates is the stricter requirement of proof of eligibility as offspring 
to which they may be held vis-a-vis their legitimate counterparts. 
While statutory classifications may not absolutely deny benefits to 
illegitimates, governmental units may require a different and stricter 
demonstration of eligibility of illegitmates than of legitimate children 
where such a showing is "carefully tuned" to a legitimate interest of 
that unit.124 Thus, in order to qualify for surviving children's in-
surance benefits under the Social Security Act, illegitimates can be 
required to prove affirmatively a dependency relationship with the 
decedent while such a relationship is presumed in the instance of 
a legitimate child.125 Likewise, a state may constitutionally provide 
that an illegitimate may not inherit from his father unless he had 
been acknowledged by the decedent.126 
Of course, not all illegitimate children are subjected to such 
problems of proof. For example, the stringent requirement of a 
prior adjudication of paternity as a prerequisite to inheritance from 
an intestate father can be alleviated if the father makes a will.127 
Furthermore, all states provide procedures by which a child may be 
legitimated.128 These factors, coupled with the narrow scope of evi-
constitutionally suspect. It continues to require only that the statutory classification 
bear some rational relation to a legitimate state purpose. Trimble v. Gordon, 97 
S. Ct. 1459 (1977). In reality, however, the scrutiny "'is not a toothless one.'" 
97 S. Ct. at 1463 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976) ), That is, 
the test appears to require more than merely a "rational basis." See 91 S. Ct. at 
1470-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
124. Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S. Ct. 1459, 1466 (1977) (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 
427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976) ). The "carefully tuned" criterion is aimed at limiting 
the breadth of classifications that treat illegitimates differently from legitimates. In 
Trimble, having conceded that the state had a legitimate interest in avoiding spurious 
claims of paternity that may interfere with the distribution of an estate and that 
can be refuted only by the deceased, the Court found that a statute that disinherited 
all illegitimates from taking from their intestate fathers was unconstitutional because 
it extended beyond the interest of the state, i.e., it failed to permit inheritance when 
paternity was already established and there was no possibility that the distribution 
process could be disrupted. 
125. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). The practical effect of Lucas 
might be to deny such benefits to illegitimates, since dependency can be established 
only by a showing that the child lived with the decedent or that the decedent provided 
for the child's support. In many states, the acts sufficient to establish dependency 
would be tantamount to acknowledging the child-a step that could result in a sup-
port obligation. See note 116 supra. 
126. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). Cf. Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S, 
Ct. 1459 (1977), discussed in note 121 supra. 
127. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 539 (1971). But see Trimble v. Gor-
don, 97 S. Ct. 1459, 1467 (1977), where the court stated that the fact that an in-
testate father could have made a will to provide for the illegitimate child did not 
mitigate the constitutional infirmity of a statute absolutely prohibiting such inheri-
tance. 
128. See, e.g., .Commonwealth ex rel. Leider v. Leider, 434 Pa. 293, 299, 254 
A.2d 306, 310 (1969) (Roberts, J., concurring). 
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dence excluded by the rule,129 seem to indicate that -the rule is of 
consequence in relatively few instances.130 
It might still be argued that, although infrequently applied, the 
rule ought to be invoked to prevent the imposition of any disability-
a little protection is better than none at all. To that extent the legal-
disabilities argument provides support for the rule. Whether the 
rule ultimately is supportable in conjunction with other considera-
tions, however, remains to be considered below.181 
A second factor to be examined in the context of the "best inter-
ests of the child" is the social opprobrium that accompanies a dec-
laration of illegitimacy.132 In this discussion, the social disabilities 
resulting from the parental dispute over his legitimacy assume two 
forms: the effect on the child's emotional self and the effect on the 
child's relationship to society. To the extent that the disability re-
sults from some internal psychological need of the child to know the 
natural parents, 133 the harm is probably not mitigated by the rule. 
Also, the mere fact that legitimacy is being litigated, or that testi-
mony is being presented from which nonaccess can be inferred, 
would seem to cause as much emotional damage to the child as the 
nonaccess testimony the rule attempts to exclude.184 
To the degree that the social stigma relates to the external reac-
tion of society to the bastard child, it is evident that the rule i~ of 
decreasing utility because of the change in social attitudes in th.~ 
United States. The increase in the incidence of illegitimate births 
in recent years135 suggests that more members of society have come 
in contact with illegitimates, which may reduce the incidence of 
stereotyped attitudes formed in isolation from such individuals. 
Moreover, a recent study concluded that most people do not favor 
burdening illegitimates with legal disabilities.136 To the extent that 
129. See text at notes 83-86 supra. 
130. See note 13 supra. 
131. See text at notes 187-88 infra. 
132. See Wyatt, supra note 92, at 452; note 104 supra. It is uncertain whether 
the elimination of illegitimacy as a legal concept would eradicate its social stigma. 
Compare Davis, supra note 102, at 229 with Wallach & Tenoso, supra note 102, 
at 29-31. 
133. One would expect that a child has a natural yearning to know his true 
parentage. Every child has the need to feel rooted, to find himself, and to know 
his true origins. . . . The anxiety to learn what was in his past may be patho-
logical, making it more difficult for the child to lead a useful life and to form 
meaningful relationships. 
In re Adoption by K, 92 N.J. Super. 204, 208, 222 A.2d 552, S54 (1966). 
134. See Note, Non-Access and Pennsylvania, 29 U. PnT. L. RE.v. S59, 565 
(1968). 
135. The yearly rate of illegitimate births per 1000 live births has increased 
dramatically from 37.9 in 1940 to 132.3 in 1974. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALm, EouCA-
noN, AND WELFARE, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr OF nm UNlTED SrATES: 1976, at 58 
(1976). 
136. In a 1968 public survey conducted by the University of lliinois, 96% of 
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attitudes toward legal disabilities broadly reflect societal norms, 137 
this finding indicates a softening of the negative social attitudes toward 
illegitimates. Furthermore, since the relaxation of legal incapacities 
generally follows rather than leads the relaxation in social attitudes, 13 t1 
the recent trend to eliminate the legal disabilities associated with 
illegitimacy suggests an antecedent reduction of the social stigma 
associated with that status. Thus, it appears that social rejection has 
ceased to be a substantial burden of illegitimacy: "The social posi-
tion of the child has . . . vastly improved, for it is no longer regarded 
as an outcast, but is admitted to all of the activities of the commu-
nity. "139 Consequently, the cogency of this rationale for applying 
the Mansfield Rule has diminished. 140 
A final variation of the best-interests rationale suggests that the 
rule should be invoked to decrease the risk of a declaration of illegiti-
macy and the consequent loss of support from the nominal father. 
This argument, however, is too broad: the unstated assumption is 
that the nominal father is always a better source of support than the 
natural father.141 It is true that·the nominal father is known and 
thus provides the child with someone from whom support can be 
sought. But there is nothing to suggest that enforcement and collec-
tion problems are reduced by placing the duty of support on the 
nominal, rather than the natural, father.142 
This argument regarding the support from the nominal father 
seems especially attenuated in the context of a paternity suit. Al-
though the reasons for bringing such a suit are varied and difficult 
to infer from case law, -it is not unreasonable to assume that a com-
mon motivating factor is that the defendant might be a better source 
those polled felt the law should not disadvantage an illegitimate child, H. KRAUSE, 
supra note 94, at 172. 
131. See Davis, supra note 102, at 223. 
138. See Commonwealth ex rel. Leider v. Leider, 434 Pa. 293, 299, 254 A.2d 
306, 310 (1969) (Roberts, J., concurring). 
139. 1 S. ScHATKIN, supra note 13, § 1.12, at 1-60. This change in attitude 
is reflected in periodical literature. In 1914, it was suggested that society should 
"[m]ake illegitimacy costly and burdensome, ... [so that] it will decline." Man-
gold, Unlawful Motherhood, 53 FORUM 343 (1914). This attitude is in marked 
contrast to feelings recently expressed in a national magazine by Rod McKuen: 
In the process of my hunt for my father, it would come out that I, too, had 
fathered an illegitimate son, although to me he is legitimate in every way. . • , 
Once he said to me, "Being a love-child is the best thing in the world. It 
means you were really wanted." 
McKuen, My Search for My Father, Gooo HOUSEKEEPING, May 1976, at 120, 220. 
140. See Serafin v. Serafin, 67 Mich. App. 517, 525, 241 N.W.2d 272, 276 (1976), 
affd. on other grounds, No. 58211 (Mich., filed Oct. 24, 1977); Commonwealth 
ex rel. Savruk v. Derby, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 560, 565-66, 344 A.2d 624, 627 (1975). 
141. See H. KRAUSE, supra note 94, at 85-86. But see R-. v. R-., 431 S.W.2d 
152 (Mo. 1968). 
142. See note 95 supra. 
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than the nominal father for support, both in amount and reliability.143 
Thus, in a paternity suit, the application of Lord Mansfield's Rule 
might well be contrary to the economic interests of the child and 
result only in protecting the interests of a culpable_ defendant.144 
This last situation highlights a further defect in relying upon the 
"best interests of the child" rationale to support the rule: this ra-
tionale tends to focus only on the economic interest of the child, ig-
noring the interests of the spouses who have placed their dispute be-
fore the court. The "best interests" rationale is not used to exclude 
the interests of other parties in other areas of the law,145 and it 
should not be so used in the support context. While it is not unrea-
sonable to give special consideration to the financial well-being of 
the child whose legitimacy is disputed, evidentiary rules ought not 
disregard totally the interests of the parties who first placed a di-
vorce or paternity proceeding before the court. 
In some circumstances strict application of Lord Mansfield's Rule 
will not properly balance the interests of the litigants. For example, 
the use of the rule in a paternity suit would prohibit the prose-
cutrix's nonaccess testimony, which may be necessary to rebut the 
presumption of legitimacy and to prove parentage. As pointed out 
above, 146 it is unclear that the rule's usage here would benefit the 
child. The mother would not favor use of the rule because she ini-
tiated the suit to obtain support. Likewise, the nominal father prob-
ably would oppose use of the rule since he will be responsible for 
the child's support if the burden is not placed on the defendant. 
Only the defendant in the paternity suit would wish to invoke the 
rule in order to avoid the assessment of support. Thus, maximiza-
tion of the parties' interests in this situation-particularly if extra 
weight is accorded the child's financial welfare-cannot justify the 
use of the rule. 
Of course, a similar evaluation of the interests may support using 
the rule in a divorce case in which the mother has custody. The 
child clearly will benefit from a finding of legitimacy if the natural 
father is unknown or unavailable. The mother would similarly favor 
the use of the rule. Although there might be an element of unfair-
ness toward the nominal father,147 the interests of the child and 
143. It might be argued that the nominal father would always be a source of 
support available as an alternative to the paternity suit. As a practical matter, how-
ever, the paternity suit might not be brought if the nominal father were still avail-
able to provide support for the child. 
144. See note 91 supra. 
145. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SoLNIT, BEYOND TIIE BEST INTERESTS OF 
THE CHILD 109-10 (1973). 
146. See text at notes 143-44 supra. 
147. As a matter of social policy, there may be nothing wrong with placing sup-
port burdens on the nominal father even though there is no biological responsibility, 
particularly if the "best interests of the child" are considered of ultimate importance. 
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mother may be considered dominant. 148 Thus, in this context, the 
rule draws some support from a "best interests" rationale. 
D. Exclusion of Unreliable Testimony 
The last major rationale advanced in support of Lord Mansfield's 
Rule is that it excludes testimony that is easily fabricated and, by 
its peculiarly personal nature, difficult to corroborate. Although 
not explicitly articulated by the courts, this fear of fraud and unre-
liability appears to be based upon nothing more than a theory of dis-
qualification for interest.149 This rationale, however, fails to provide 
a persuasive justification for the use of the rule because the modern 
law of evidence rejects disqualification for interest.150 It is generally 
believed that the self-serving nature of testimony should go to its 
weight and not its admissibility, and that the trier of fact should be 
allowed to assess the credibility of the witness.151 
E. Conclusions on the Justifications for 
Lord Mansfield's Rule 
Of all the affirmative reasons advanced for the application of 
Lord Mansfield's Rule, only the "best interests" rationale offers any 
credible basis for excluding nonaccess testimony. But in only two 
circumstances are the best interests of the child clearly furthered: 
where a stringent requirement of proof must be met in order to 
prevent the loss of benefits or status as an heir, 152 and in most divorce 
If such a standard of responsibility is desired, however, the presumption of legitimacy 
ought to be conclusively declared rather than indirectly applied through an evidenti-
ary restriction such as Lord Mansfield's Rule. 
148. But noneconomic factors must be considered as well. For example, the ex-
clusion of nonaccess testimony may embitter the nominal father, totally destroying 
any possibility of a meaningful relationship between the child and him. See Wyatt, 
supra note 92, at 452. 
In certain situations, a support decree against the nominal father may be unde-
sirable to the extent that it may alienate his family, possibly a far more valuable 
economic and social resource than the husband. See Stack & Semmel, The Concept 
of Family in the Poor Black Community, in SuBCOMMITIEE ON FISCAL POLICY OF 
THE JOINT EcoNOMIC COMMfITEE, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., THE FAMILY, POVERTY, 
AND WELFARE PROGRAMS: HOUSEHOLD PATI"ERNS AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES 275, 
287 (Studies In Public Welfare Paper No. 12, Part II, Comm. Print 1973). 
In the majority of divorce cases, however, the application of the rule can prob-
ably be justified purely in terms of economic benefits to the child. 
149. See text at note 34. While some opinions refrain from explicitly identifying 
this rationale for Lord Mansfield's Rule, the reasoning is manifested in evidentiary 
rules requiring a more stringent standard of proof where the spouse's testimony-
though otherwise admissible-is uncorroborated. See, e.g., State v. E.A.H., 246 
Minn. 299, 15 N.W.2d 195 (1956). 
150. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 575. 
151. McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 65, at 144. 
152. See, e.g., King v. Peninsular Portland Cement Co., 216 Mich. 335, 185 N.W. 
858 (1921). 
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proceedings.153 In section IV criticisms promulgated independently 
of the rationales supporting the rule are analyzed and weighed against 
the benefits that may accrue from the rule in the limited contexts in 
which it seemingly is valid. 
IV. INDEPENDENT CRITICISMS OF THE RULE 
The jurisdictions that reject Lord Mansfield's Rule have not only 
generally refuted the policies put forward in its favor but have also 
advanced independent arguments supporting its abrogation. One of 
the most forceful rationales for overturning the rule concerns the ob-
ject it is designed to safeguard-the presumption of legitimacy. 
While the presumption is rebuttable in all jurisdictions under at least 
some circumstances, 154 most states have sought to bolster the pre-
sumption by requiring that proof of illegitimacy be clear and con-
vincing155 or beyond a reasonable doubt.156 Chief Judge Cardozo 
for the New York Court of Appeals laid down an even more strin-
gent requirement when he wrote that the presumption could not be 
rebutted "unless common sense and reason are outraged by the hold-
ing that [the presumption] abides."157 
This presumptive burden of persuasion renders negligible any 
benefits resulting from the application of Lord Mansfield's Rule:158 
"While there is a policy which favors legitimation of children con-
ceived or born in wedlock, that policy is adequately expressed in the 
presumption of legitimacy."159 Even if nonaccess testimony is ad-
mitted, it alone may be insufficient to overcome a presumption of 
legitimacy unless independent evidence is also presented.160 
153. See text at notes 147-48 supra. 
154. See Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 158 (1972). 
155. See, e.g., Donahey v. Donahey, 52 Ala. App. 596, 599, 296 So. 2d 188, 
191 (1974); State v. Mejia, 97 Ariz. 215, 218, 399 P.2d 116, 118 (1965) (en bane); 
CAL. C1v. CooE § 7004 (West Supp. 1976). 
156. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 299 Mass. 7, 8-9, 11 N.E.2d 482, 484 
(1937); Stone v. Stone, 210 So. 2d 672, 674 (Miss. 1968). - But see Gibbons v. 
Maryland Cas. Co., 114 Ga. App. 788, 793, 152 S.E.2d 815, 819 (1966); Shelley 
v. Smith, 249 Md. 619, 624, 241 A.2d 682, 684 (1968), in which only a preponder-
ance of the evidence was needed to rebut the presumption. 
157. In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 8, 170 N.E. 471, 473 (1930). A similarly strong 
presumption is found in Ripplinger v. Ripplinger, 9 Wash. App. 166, 511 P.2d 82 
(1973). 
158. The presumption of legitimacy is an exception to the usual "bursting bubble" 
theory of presumptions, as both the burden of persuasion and the burden of produc-
ing evidence are shifted to the party claiming illegitimacy. McCORMICK, supra note 
2, § 345, at 822. 
159. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 15 Mich. App. 607, 615, 167 N.W.2d 114, 118 (1969). 
160. "[T]he mere statements, admissions, allegations or agreements made by the 
parties to this divorce proceeding standing alone are not sufficient to rebut the strong 
presumption of legitimacy ..•. " Buchanan v. Buchanan, 256 Ind. 119, 123, 267 
N.E.2d 155, 157 (1971). 
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More important, protecting the interests of the child through a 
strong presumption of legitimacy removes many of the costs associ-
ated with the Mansfield Rule. First, the rule forces a court to render 
a judgment without regard to the whole truth.161 Application of the 
rule results in the exclusion of the most relevant and probative 
testimony available concerning the fact of nonaccess: by their very 
nature the sexual relations between husband and wife are generally 
not subject to proof by third-party testimony.162 Yet, third-party 
testimony is the only evidence of nonaccess allowed by the rule. 
Moreover, in some circumstances the exclusion of spousal testimony 
removes not only the best but the only evidence available of nonac-
cess.163 
When probative evidence is excluded from the factfinding pro-
cess, serious social consequences may result. As a New Jersey 
court stated in regard to Lord Mansfield's Rule: 
(l]t is a rather serious indictment against . . . legal jurispru-
dence .. . . to compel one who, under our judicial branch of gov-
ernment, is vested with the powers and duties of interpreting and 
administering the law, to say, in limine, "I am compelled to decide 
this case against what seems to be the truth of it."104 
Not only may those within the judicial structure be dissatisfied with 
the intransigence of the rule,165 but the spouse who is denied an op-
portunity to present important evidence may lose respect for the ju-
dicial system.166 Likewise, the public is likely to be scornful of a 
system of justice that excludes important information.167 Unlike 
161. See Ventresco v. Bushey, 159 Me. 241, 245, 191 A.2d 104, 106 (1963); 
Loudon v. Loudon, 114 N.J. Eq. 242, 246, 168 A. 840, 841 (1933 ). 
162. See Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383,394, 172 So. 317,320 (1937); Common-
wealth ex rel. Leider v. Leider, 210 Pa. Super. Ct. 433, 440, 233 A.2d 917, 920 
(1967) (Hoffman, J., dissenting). 
163. If nonaccess testimony is the only evidence available to support the liti-
gant's cause of action, the application of the rule might violate due process principles. 
See text at notes 172-75 infra. 
164. Loudon v. Loudon, 114 N.J. Eq. 242,246, 168 A. 840,841 (1933). 
165. In his dissent in Commonwealth ex rel. Leider v. Leider, 210 Pa. Super. 
Ct. 433, 233 A.2d 917 (1967), Judge Hoffman observed: . 
I can find no justification or morality in a rule which tends to absolve the right-
ful father of his duty of support, while imposing such an obligation upon an 
innocent husband merely because of his marital relationship. 
210 Pa. Super. Ct. at 442, 233 A.2d at 921. 
166. One of the central emotional concerns of the domestic-relations litigant may 
often be to have the opportunity--even if the suit should fail-to present one's own 
side of the facts. To the extent that this therapy is denied by the rule, dissatisfac-
tion with the litigation and with the judicial system may result. 
167. See lnbau, Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor's 
Stand, 53 J. C!uM. L.C. & P.S. 85, 86 (1962) (criticizing "turn 'em loose" court 
decisions mandated by the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961). 
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other instances in which such social costs may be justified by the im-
portant interests furthered by the exclusion of evidence, 168 it has 
been shown above that no overriding social policy is consistently ad-
vanced by the rule. · 
Finally the courts' continued reliance on the rule tends to per-
petuate legal disabilities. That is, to the extent that the rule pre-
vents declarations of illegitimacy,169 the judiciary and legislature are 
insulated from pressure that, if more individuals were subject to such 
disabilities, might · otherwise be generated to change the laws related 
to illegitimacy.170 
The presumption of legitimacy, on the other hand, uniformly af-
fects all domestic relations proceedings not by excluding otherwise 
relevant evidence but rather by allowing all relevant evidence to be 
received and weighed by the factfinder against a stringent burden 
of persq.asion. As Justice Roberts of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court pointed out in a concurring opinion recommending abolition 
of Lord Mansfield's Rule: "We should not blind ourselves to ger-
mane evidence as to non-access when it is available . . . . [B]y the 
same token, we should require those who would establish illegiti-
macy through such testimony to carry a heavy burden, one which 
is in accordance with our public policy in favor of legitimate status."171 
A strong presumption of legitimacy safeguards the child while main-
taining the integrity of the judicial process as a search for truth. 
Related to the above policy consideration is a possibly more seri-
ous criticism: it may be that Lord Mansfield's Rule is constitutionally 
suspect on due process grounds. In reviewing other contexts, the 
Supreme Court recently used the due process clause to strike down 
conclusive statutory presumptions that are not supported by a legiti-
mate state interest172 or that assume facts which are not "necessarily 
or universally true in fact." 173 In jurisdictions that commingle a 
168. See Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts'' and "The-
ories", 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 171, 193 (1962) (supporting the exclusionary rule 
as the "best means available ... for enforcing guarantees of liberty and privacy.") 
169. Such instances admittedly do not occur with great frequency. See notes 
13 & 83-86 supra and accompanying text. 
170. -See Note, supra note 134, at 563. 
. 171. Commonwealth ex rel. Leider v. Leider, 434 Pa. 293, 299, 254 A.2d 306, 
310 (1969) (Roberts, J., concurring). Similar sentiments are expressed in Davis 
v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 601, 607 (Tex. 1975). -
172. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972) (right of natural father 
to offer proof of fitness to have custody of illegitimate child). 
173. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973) (emphasis added) (right to 
offer proof to rebut presumption of nonresidency regarding college tuition). Accord, 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 643-48 (1974) (right to offer 
proof to rebut presumption that pregnant women are physically incapable of fulfill-
ing teaching duties). 
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stringent presumption of legitimacy with Lord Mansfield's Rule,174 
the theoretically rebuttable presumption of legitimacy may be ren-
dered irrebuttable in a practical sense: 
To impose upon the plaintiff the burden of proving beyond a rea-
sonable doubt the impossibility of access at the time of conception 
of the child and then to disqualify both her and her former husband 
as witnesses to that fact, is to set up an insuperable barrier to the 
establishment of the truth.175 
Although there are policy considerations favoring a presumption 
of legitimacy, there is no basis for universally assuming that, as a 
factual matter, spouses had sexual relations during the period of time 
relevant to the litigation. Moreover, with the availability of pater-
nity proceedings against third parties176 and public assistance from 
our current system of welfare, it also seems unclear that any state 
interest exists for utilizing the rule other than the desire to maintain 
familial institutions.177 As was argued above, 178 it is highly ques-
tionable whether even this interest in familial institutions is in fact 
furthered at all by the rule. Hence, a decree in a divorce case in 
which the rule was invoked that assesses support payments against 
the nominal father is, arguably, a taking of property without due pro-
cess of law, for here the rule serves no legitimate state interest and 
as a practical matter operates as an irrebuttable presumption. 179 
174. Virtually all the states adopting the rule identified in note 43 supra also 
adhere to a stringent presumption. See Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 158 (1972). 
175. Yerian v. Brinker, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 591, 594, 35 N.E.2d 878, 881 (Ct. App. 
1941). 
176. See text at note 91 supra. 
177. See text at note 68 supra. But see Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S. Ct. 1459 
(1977), where the interest in furthering the familial institution was apparently found 
insufficient to justify the discriminatory classification of illegitimate children. See 
note 121 supra. 
178. See text at notes 76-79 supra. 
179. In the only cases dealing with this issue, two different panels of the Michi-
gan Court of Appeals reached opposite results. Noting that independent testimony 
and blood tests might be available to spouses, one panel held that there was no 
irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy because Lord Mansfield's Rule does not pro-
hibit all nonaccess evidence. People v. Wiseman, 63 Mich. App. 137, 140, 234 
N.W.2d 429, 431-32 (1975). However, another panel ruled that a "rule of law need 
not exclude all evidence contrary to a presumption to be constitutionally infirm." 
Serafin v. Serafin, 67 Mich. App. 517, 523, 241 N.W.2d 272, 275 (1976), alfd. 011 
other groullds, No. 58211 (Mich., filed Oct. 24, 1977). The Sera/ill court held that, 
if the rule operates to deny a party a fair opportunity to rebut the presumption, it is 
constitutionally defective. 67 Mich. App. at 524, 241 N.W.2d at 275. Unlike Wise-
ma11, it was clear in Serafin that no potential independent evidence of illegitimacy was 
available, but the court failed to emphasize this distinction: "Preventing a party 
from introducing his own evidence runs contrary to basic tenets of fundamental fair-
ness .... " 67 Mich. App. at 525,241 N.W.2d at 276. 
Even if the holding in Serafin is limited to cases in which there is no potential 
independent evidence of illegitimacy, the rule is still ineffective because where inde-
pendent evidence is available it might be sufficient to rebut the presumption. Under 
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V. ALTERNATIVES TOLORDMANSFIELD'S RULE 
Independent criticisms indicate that the exclusion of spousal tes-
timony concerning nonaccess not only involves unnecessary social 
costs but also may be constitutionally infirm. Several proposals 
might be advanced to correct these deficiencies. First, the scope 
of the rule could be expanded to exclude a broader range of evi-
dence in order to further more effectively the concerns said to under-
lie the rule. Second, the rule could be limited to apply to only those 
situations in which spousal testimony is uncorroborated. Third, ap-
plication of the rule could be limited to those cases in which the rule 
clearly advances the policies supporting it; this suggestion would ap-
ply the rule only to most divorce cases180 and cases in which there 
is a potential of inheritance disability.181 Lastly, the rule could be 
abolished in favor of a strong presumption of legitimacy. The last 
of these proposals appears to be the most reasonable alternative. 
The first alternative, to expand the scope of the rule so that its 
supporting justifications might be realistically accomplished, would 
appear to exclude too much probative evidence. It would require 
exclusion of all testimony tending to scandalize the marital relation 
and the bond between parent and child, all testimony tending to 
place the burden of support of a child on the state, and all testimony 
tending to subject the child to the legal and social disabilities of 
illegitimacy. Such an alternative appears unreasonable.182 It has 
already been shown that the trend of judicial opinion is to abolish 
such restrictions and that the external policy considerations support-
ing the rule have substantially diminished in contemporary society.18\1 
The second alternative, which would admit spousal nonaccess 
testimony only if it is supplemented by corroborating testimony, 
already enjoys application in some jurisdictions.184 However, this 
option may have the constitutional infirmity of rendering the pre-
either interpretation of the constitutional restriction, Lord Mansfield's Rule appears 
impotent to protect the child's status. 
180. See text at and following notes 147-48 supra. 
181. See text at note 124 supra. 
182. The expansion of the rule might increase the number of logically inde-
fensible results. For example, such a broad rule would require a contrary result 
in State v. Wade, 264 N.C. 144, 141 S.E.2d 34 (1956), where the nonsupport convic-
tion of a putative father was reversed because of the improper admission of nonaccess 
testimony that the child had been born three years after the spouses had separated. 
183. See text at notes 115 & 135-40 supra. 
184. Maryland's statutory modification of the rule permits the presentation of 
nonaccess testimony after it has been independently established that the spouses are 
living apart. See note 46 supra. California has a similar rule. See id. Australia 
requires that corroborative testimony be produced in order to admit nonaccess testi-
mony. See Bates, Lovers' Perjuries-Some Reflection on Corroboration of Evidence 
in Affiliation Proceedings, 48 AuSTL. LJ. 83 (1974). 
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sumption of legitimacy irrebuttable in some instances. 180 Also, such 
a liberalization of the rule would fail to mitigate its harsh social con-
sequences, 186 and the best and most relevant evidence of nonaccess 
would still be excluded when corroborating testimony is unavailable. 
Application of. the rule might alternatively be limited to those 
cases in which the supporting rationales of the rule are consistently 
furthered. Such a limitation, however, mistakenly assumes that a 
desired substantive result-the inhibition of illegitimacy decrees-
is best achieved through the use of rules of evidence.187 It has al-
ready been demonstrated that the social norm188 and public 
charge180 rationales are not furthered by the rule. However, in the 
context of divorce cases or where stricter proof requirements are im-
posed to prevent the loss of benefits, application of the rule arguably 
advances the best interests of the child.100 Yet, in practice, the 
best-interests policy translates into imposing a desired substan-
tive result: insuring a source of financial support for the child, re-
gardless of the source's moral responsibility. It is more rational to 
achieve that result by substantive law than by a rule of evidence. Thus, 
the best interests ought to be considered directly as a factor in deci-
sionmaking, or the general presumption of legitimacy might be 
adjusted in proportion to the strength of the interests in a particular 
case.191 In any event, the substantive presumption of legitimacy is 
a superior means of safeguarding the policies relevant to Lord Mans-
field's Rule. 
The total abolition of Lord Mansfield's Rule is subject to none 
of these criticisms. The presumption of legitimacy with a stringent 
standard of proof adequately safeguards the interest of society in pro-
tecting the child from a declaration of illegitimacy without incurring 
the costs associated with Lord Mansfield's Rule.102 Being rebut-
table, the presumption is not subject to a constitutional challenge 
based on due process. More importantly, it guarantees that the trier 
of fact will be able to reach a determination based on a full and fair 
hearing of all of the facts. 
185. See text at notes 174-75 supra and note 179 supra. 
186. See text at notes 161-70 supra. 
187. See J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 511-15 
(1898), quoted in 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2, at 8. Professor Thayer argued 
that the use of evidentiary rules to achieve substantive results increased the likeli-
hood of unjust decisions. 
188. See text at note 86 supra. 
189. See text at notes 91-100 supra. 
190. See text following note 151 supra. 
191. For example, only a preponderance of evidence might be required in pater-
nity cases where a finding of illegitimacy would benefit the child. In divorce cases, 
however, such a decree would involve a loss of support, and thus a more stringent 
burden-clear and convincing evidence-might be required. 
192 . .See text following note 160 supra. 
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Finally, it should be noted that there is no basis for deference 
to the legislature in abolishing the rule. Although it has been ar-
gued that the longstanding acceptance of the rule makes its rejection 
a legislative function,193 time alone does not immunize a rule from 
judicial change.194 The rule is not one upon which reliance has 
been placed, and thus its abolition creates no unfairness to any of 
the parties before the court. 
Moreover, abolition of the rule will not cause a profound change 
in our thinking about legal policy concerning the law of evidence 
and illegitimacy. Such changes have already occurred, both in the 
courts and society. Rather, these modern notions of public policy 
should ·be applied to purge our judicial system of a burdensome and 
unnecessary rule. 
193. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dolloff v. Sargent, 100 N.H. 29, 31-32, 118 A.2d 
596, 598 (1955). 
194. See Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975). 
